After Fyodor Mikhaylovich Dostoyevsky was sentenced to death by the Tsar of Russia for alleged royal subversion, some intuitive conviction in the great writer bordering Extra Sensory Perception told him for sure that he will not be hanged.
On the morning of execution, promulgation came out from the palace sparing Dostoevsky and fellow convicts from the rope and deporting them to cold prisons in Siberia. The whole thing was a drama (mock execution) and on the night before the same, it was noted by the author that the hair of his prison inmate, a fellow-convict, turned grey out of excessive anxiety. The palace circle which staged the drama even deliberated at length whether or not to dig graves in advance just to add a realistic punch to the whole episode.
The outcome: Dostoyevsky and his inmates thanked King profusely and remained indebted to the King for the rest of their lives even as they labored hard in Siberia.(Dostoyevsky even wrote a poem in praise of His Highness while he was in prison.)
While India’s vote at the UNHRC was against Sri Lanka, and marked a paradigm shift in its stand pertaining to country-specific resolutions, the vote against Sri Lanka has been interpreted as:
1. Feet-dragging until the last minute by Indian government
2. Buckling to American pressure on the issue
3. Allowing Foreign Policy to be dictated by Tamil Nadu politics
4. Estranging Sri Lanka
5. Pushing Sri Lanka into the strategic embrace of China
Before checking out the validity of these arguments, let me just introduce a self-explanatory prop, straight out of the revised draft of the US sponsored resolution at human rights council.
Change in a few words and punctuations, but Sri Lanka got what it wanted; all because of India. If the US draft had been adopted, it would have spelt a disaster in terms of sovereignty and strategic autonomy of Sri Lanka, estranging the island nation from the international community and deepening further the ethnic rivalry between the Sinhalese and Tamils; needless to say, a political-diplomatic disaster was averted.
But Sri Lanka also had its Dostoyevskian moment. It remains a fact that India voted against Sri Lanka. And it is a political no-nonsense statement disapproving of the attitude and complacency of the government of Sri Lanka. India offered Sri Lanka an Iron hand softened by a back-channel diplomatic glove. The death sentence was passed. But ultimately Sri Lanka got spared. At the same time no diplomatic blank-cheque was handed over by India.
No wonder Sri Lanka, subsequent to initial fretting and fuming –diplomatic theatrics--decided not to make politically incorrect statements; perhaps out of a Dostoevskian gratitude. It did not and could not praise India.
Nonetheless, President Mahinda Rajapkase, in his statements did not refer to India in a critical manner.
Now, coming down to the five arguments:
1. Rather than India dragging its feet, it could possibly be that India kept its diplomats on their toes. To save the wounded Sinhalese lion from the teeth of the T-Rexian US diplomats was no easy challenge. It was as if the document was handed over to India with an open mandate. India did use the editing tools viciously. The dragging-feet-theorists should understand that getting things done in the diplomatic circles can often be time consuming and taxing and sometimes thankless a job.
2. Rather than India buckling under US pressure, the case seemingly was other way around. US bowed to India in this regard. A comparable success would have been when India successfully lobbied and kept Richard Holbrooke—Obama’s special envoy for Af-Pak region-- out of pursuing Kashmir issue.
3. Seemingly, the government at the Center looked hapless in the face of the Tamil opposition to central government going slow on the Sri Lankan issue. DMK even threatened to pull out its ministers and Jayalalithaa wrote twice to the Prime Minister on the issue. But it has to be noted that DMK is at a disadvantage in Tamil Nadu as well as in national politics especially because of its scam-ridden image. With the party not being in power in Tamil Nadu, it would not want to aggravate its poor condition by estranging Congress and going overboard in rhetoric. In other words, it did not want to commit a political suicide. The point is: even as Tamil Nadu politicians created uproar on the Sri Lankan issue, it impacted the policy formulation by Manmohan Singh government to the extent that the issue was thrust into the national limelight resulting in a departure from government’s position on country-specific resolutions.
4. Given that India saved Sri Lanka from a nightmare from materializing, the Sri Lankan government should have had a friendly pat for India. But given the populist nature of the whole issue and considering the Sinhalese pressure, it could be impossible for the Sri Lankan government to do that. The Sri Lankan press would accuse India of back-stabbing and haul other abuses. But the UN document is a testimony that India delivered on its position even as it walked a tight rope and exhibited political correctness.
5. Analysts are vehemently arguing that the Indian vote has knocked the nation out of its position of strategic leverage vis-à-vis China. They say India has committed a grave mistake by ‘pushing Sri Lanka towards Chinese embrace’.
It is undeniable that Sri Lanka has won the Elam war because China helped it profusely. While the western aid/grants and weapons were tethered to conditions that would have restrained the Sri Lankan government from fighting the way it did, China chipped in with unconditional aid/grants and weapons.
Chinese stand was simple:
“We have to understand that the Sri Lankan conflict lasted for three decades and that thousands died. The LTTE were terrorists, as even the UN agreed. The Sri Lankan Government was a legitimate sovereign state actor to procure arms. The end of the war was good news and we need to be frank that it was not mediation that achieved it.”
This is in the face of the USA suspending grant aid in early 2007, pending improvements in the security situation and Germany reducing bilateral aid even as the United Kingdom (UK) suspended US$3 million of debt relief.
It has to be noted that Sri Lanka was one of the first countries to recognise the People’s Republic of China in 1950. And going by history, China’s Sri Lankan stand is consistent with their previous chapters in bilateral engagement.
In 1963, China and Sri Lanka signed a commercial maritime agreement to foster trade, though it was seen in India and by some in the West as an attempt by China to extend its naval presence. Sri Lanka even backed Chinese bid for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.
“In 1972 numerous aid, trade and arms deals were signed and by 1975 China was Sri Lanka’s largest export destination, leading some to wonder whether Sri Lanka made herself too reliant on the East Asian giant” [See the case study on Sri Lanka appeared in ‘China and conflict-affected states: Between principle and pragmatism’ written by Thomas Wheeler and brought out by ‘Saferworld’]
The point to be remembered is this: This is not a sudden surge in friendship experienced in the bilateral relations between Sri Lanka and China. Whatever the nature of their relationship, it is consistent with historical relations.
Moreover, it would be a strategic blunder for Sri Lanka if it relies too much either on India or on China estranging one at the cost of the other.
Ideally, it should balance aspirations of both powers and leverage maximum strategic mileage.
Published in: http://asiastudies.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=268&Itemid=268
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